

REPORT ON CHANDISTINE ACTIVITIES  
IN HOLLAND.

GENERAL SITUATION.

GENERAL.

The attitude of the Dutch population under the German occupation in 1941 and 1942 was, in the main, apathetic and the people were not resistance-minded. To these few clandestine agents who were functioning at the time, the population was neither dangerous nor helpful. The people were not sure of their attitude towards the Germans who were trying to be as friendly and as correct as possible and to interfere as little as possible with internal conditions in the country. Thousands of Dutch civil servants and business men were confirmed in their appointments by the Germans. Whilst disliking the sight of German troops and tanks in their cities, the Dutch had no great incentive to resist and it was difficult to obtain assistance for resistance movements.

After the big strike in Amsterdam in 1942, which called forth very severe repressive measures, and the anti-Jewish drive which began in 1942, and grew in intensity throughout 1943, the people began to realize that the same repressive measures would ultimately be applied to everybody and, guided by the B.B.C. and Radio Oranje, they began to seek the means of actively resisting the Germans.

Two groups of people were affected in particular by the German decrees. Firstly, the young men who were liable for conscription to work in Germany, secondly, ex-officers who, in early 1943, were ordered to register at ANKERPOORT to be subsequently shipped off to Germany under arrest. These two affected groups provided most of the volunteers who went underground in 1943 and who began to organize methodically against the Germans.

Prior to 1943 there was no effective underground movement functioning against the German occupation. Generally speaking the population was extremely patriotic and throughout 1943 their pro-resistance sympathies grew to such an extent that by April 1944 50% of the people were working clandestinely in some way or other against the Germans. A large Catholic population was responsible for much of the propaganda in favour of resistance. Up to the middle of 1944 the population was united in its desire to rid Holland of the enemy and morale was high, but later, when it became clear that Holland would have to wait for its liberation, morale sagged badly. In early 1945 the population became less willing to assist resistance groups as they were beginning to fear reprisals which were becoming more and more brutal. Also there was a tendency in some areas to regard the H.B.S. as a terrorist organization in view of the ruthless methods sometimes adopted by H.B.S. members. Other factors which weakened the will to resist were the under-nourishment, fear of street-fighting in the towns the Allies were approaching and a reported conflict between the H.V.V., K.S. and O.B. leaders who were said to be working for their own ends and their own prestige.

Resistance activity varied according to areas. In the country, where food was relatively plentiful, morale was much higher than in the towns. Activity in Rotterdam, where there was a large working-class population, was more intense than in the Hague where resistance was confined to less

active measures such as propaganda and similar forms of passive resistance.

Operations before September 1944 were not carried out to any great extent but grew in number and importance in December 1944 and early 1945. Targets were attacked by groups of determined full-time resistance members, while the bulk of the people were suffering at the time from lowered morale due to disappointment at the failure of the Allies to eject the Germans earlier.

Some sections of the population were by January 1945 adopting a critical attitude towards the Allies. It should not be overlooked that food was the main pre-occupation at the time and how to get more food was the question paramount in everybody's mind.

In April 1945, thousands of recruits came into Resistance believing that once they were accepted by the N.S.B. they would stand a better chance of being fed.

#### PROPAGANDA.

Throughout the occupation the B.B.C. was widely listened to on illegal sets and, in the latter phases, when electricity was cut off, batteries were used to supply the necessary current. Listening parties were organized and an illegal news distributing centre existed for the dissemination of Allied propaganda.

Most of this propagation of news was done by intellectuals who listened to the B.B.C. English service, but rumour-spreading was indulged in by the working class population, who listened to Radio Oranje in Dutch. Criticisms of these Dutch broadcasts from Radio Oranje were, however, widespread and the Station was accused of being completely out of touch with the real situation and viewing things through rose-coloured glasses. Radio Oranje had, apparently, overlooked the fact that resistance movements in Holland were illegal and that the penalty for participation was death. Frequently it gave away clandestine prospects by premature announcements and was guilty of certain inaccuracies in the statements which were broadcast. On one occasion, after intensive German C.E. activity had resulted in the arrest of hundreds of people in a certain area, Radio Oranje broadcast the boast that resistance was still functioning and that the Germans had by no means caught everybody. This naturally resulted in a renewed burst of C.E. activity on the part of the Gestapo. On another occasion the station broadcast the news of the arrival in Rotterdam of certain agents two days before they were to be dropped in the area.

From 1942 onwards Radio Oranje terminated all broadcasts with the words "Keep Courage, we are coming" and this phrase became a standing joke among the resistance workers. The belief is widespread in Holland that the heavy casualties sustained in September 1944 were due to over-optimistic announcements by both the B.B.C. and Radio Oranje to the effect that Holland would be free by October. These announcements led to open revolt in some areas and careless, indiscriminate recruiting in others with disastrous results.

Pamphlets dropped by the R.A.F. were widely read by the Dutch and passed round but there were many casualties to people picking up these leaflets. The penalty



For retaining H.A.F. tracts, or passing them on, was death and the unfortunate Dutchmen caught perusing one of these leaflets was usually shot at once. These tracts were unequally distributed and the vice was taken by the underground movement that if they had been dropped to Reception Committees the Dutch themselves would have known how and where to distribute them. Many were lost as they were collected immediately they were dropped by special squads detailed for the purpose by the authorities.

A very active and efficient underground press existed in Holland throughout the occupation and the organization controlling the underground press remained in touch with London for all matters of policy. The Dutch clandestine papers had a wide circulation and the underground press was responsible for two things - 1) to raise funds for the underground movement and 2) to boost the morale of the population.

German morale was affected adversely by slogans in use by the general population and tracts were issued deliberately by the Dutch in order to mislead the Germans as to the real number of Dutchmen working in the underground movement. The numbers of people in active resistance were given as being much greater than they really were. In the latter days of the occupation no propaganda was needed to demoralize the Germans as their demoralization had become complete through lack of food and transport.

#### GROWTH OF INDIGENOUS CLANDESTINE MOVEMENTS.

Many spontaneous resistance groups came to light in the early days of the occupation, the principal ones being the ex-officers' organization which existed to aid officers who had been forced to live underground in order to avoid deportation to Germany and the student aid groups which were formed to assist young Dutchmen who were refractaries from the German labour laws.

Due to the needs of these groups other organizations grew up which were concerned with acquiring false papers, accommodation and supplies for those living illegally. The clergy were active in this respect and later did splendid work in aiding Allied airmen in the same way. Later organizations like the Doctors' Illegal Committee came into existence. This was a Committee formed to assist doctors in trouble and also to provide clandestine medical facilities for wounded patriots.

Many people in the liberal professions formed smaller groups. A nation-wide clandestine movement grew up with branches in every town to protect members of technical trades, telephone engineers, mechanics, tool-makers etc.

Up to 1943 none of these groups were in any way organized and most of their activities were concerned with defensive rather than offensive resistance. In 1943, however, most active resisters began to cast about for offensive methods of resisting the German repression and while the ex-officers busied themselves with attempts to acquire military information, the students began to commit small acts of sabotage, such as displacing signposts and puncturing the tyres of German transport.

The underground press organization had meanwhile grown to be a powerful weapon. Security at the time was negligible. One man might be a member of several different groups and there was much overlapping. People were often indiscreet and most people in resistance knew far too much about other people's business than was good for security. One incentive to better security was the presence of large numbers of N.S.B. informers. These Dutch Quislings were hated by the Dutch far more than the Germans and the first attempts to form really secret and secure clandestine groups were made as a result of penetration and betrayal effected by the N.S.B. spies.

All these early scattered groups which grew quite spontaneously served their apprenticeship in underground work quite independently but later the members were absorbed by larger groups organized on a national basis for active offensive resistance. These organized groups will be discussed later.

#### ENEMY FORCES.

Forces employed by the enemy to control underground activity were as follows:-

The Grune Polizei,  
The G.P.F.,  
The S.D. and Gestapo,  
N.S.B. - civilian agents,  
Dutch and Fleming S.S.,  
Feldgendarmarie,  
Landwecht and  
Wehrmacht.

The list indicates the degree of importance attaching to each particular force. The Grune Polizei were most feared by the Dutch underground movement and the Wehrmacht, last on the list, was considered by the underground movement to be relatively unimportant. The Grune Polizei were apparently a branch of the S.D. and the latter directed their activities. They were very active and conducted most of the razzias which were made for obtaining forced labour. The G.P.F. were controlled by the Absent and operated sometimes as civilians and sometimes in uniform. They were far more active than the Gestapo and were used for house arrests, searches and interrogations. The S.D. in uniform, comprising many former members of the Kriminal Polizei and the Grunt Polizei were in evidence all over Holland. Many of them were Gestapo men using S.D. uniforms as cover. Those members of the S.D. who wore civilian clothes became known fairly quickly to the general public. Civilian members of the N.S.B. were used extensively by the S.D. to act as informers and street watchers and were extremely dangerous, although most of them were known to the underground movement.

The Dutch and Fleming S.S. was not particularly active but had the advantage of knowing local customs and the language and were feared because of their great brutality. The Feldgendarmarie were used in the towns for street patrols as was the Wehrmacht but neither of these forces constituted any real danger. The Landwecht was composed of Dutch Nazis.



either very young or middle aged and was a nuisance but not greatly feared. They always preferred to avoid conflict with resistance unless in great strength. In general controls were relatively few until the middle of 1943 when restrictions began to be tightened up but, even then, the country districts were fairly safe and remained so throughout the occupation.

In 1943 the S.D. and the Gestapo became particularly active and after D-day in France thousands of C.I. personnel were imported into Holland. Conditions then became very difficult, especially in the towns. The control of identity papers, however, became, if anything, easier after September '44 as, in view of the increase in arms receptions the Germans were searching diligently for arms and restricted the body search to weapons which might provide clues as to the whereabouts of arms dumps. There was some rivalry between the various enemy forces and just prior to the liberation fighting broke out in the Hague between the S.D. and the Wehrmacht.

The native police. In general it can be said that the Dutch police were not an obstacle to resistance. 80% had fascist tendencies and were dangerous, 10% were afraid of German reprisals if they assisted the underground movement and were neither helpful nor dangerous. 10% helped actively and provided valuable assistance. Those policemen who were members of resistance groups acted as guides, transported stores, U/T sets, clandestine documents and newspapers and also frequently instructed the underground movement in the use of weapons and explosives. Their uniform was a valuable screen for their clandestine activities. Rank and file were usually reliable but the heads of departments were pro-Nazi and had been placed in office by the Germans. A high percentage of policemen were willing to render occasional services but withdrew their support when the Germans began to place informers in all the police offices.

In 1944 and 1945 new police battalions were raised by the Germans from predominantly S.D.B. sources. The new police force was known as the P.O.B. and wore slightly different uniforms. They were very dangerous and much feared by the Dutch underground movement.

#### COLLABORATORS.

There were in Holland at the time of the occupation approximately 600,000 members of the S.D.B. Most of them were young hotheads and there was a high proportion of criminal types. There was also a large number of middle class people who believed sincerely that the New Order would benefit their country. It was from this hard core of National Socialism that the Germans recruited the new police battalions, the Landmacht and the thousands of informers and street watchers used by the S.D. and the Gestapo. One report states that every Gestapo or S.D. agent employed 15 civilian Dutchmen who acted as his informant service. Most of these informers were, however, known to the underground movement and in September '44 nearly all ceased their activity and searched for a means of changing over to resistance.

Their activities in 1943 and 1944 were, however, very successful in penetrating underground movements. Although many farmers and peasants were of great assistance to resistance movements there were quite a number with fascist tendencies who lost no time in denouncing people who took in refugees, or escaping Allied airmen, or who picked up and circulated R.A.F. tracts in the country districts. Many people recovered parachutes and hid them, using the silk for their own purposes. Quite a number of people were denounced for this alone by N.S.B. farmers and peasants. Many farmers were dealing in the Black Market and supplied the underground or the Germans quite indiscriminately and for their own ends.

After the liberation there were thousands of borderline cases and it is extremely difficult to decide whether these people collaborated willingly with the Germans or not. Thousands of people in the underground movement worked legally for the German administration and used their employment as cover for their clandestine activities. Equally thousands of people worked willingly for the Germans and now say that they did it in order to assist the resistance movement.



# ORGANIZED CLANDESTINE GROUPS:

From the many scattered and unorganized clandestine groups which sprang up in the early days of the occupation grew large nation-wide movements well co-ordinated and fairly well-disciplined, each movement confining its activity to a type of resistance activity in which it specialized.

From the needs of refractaires in search of false papers, funds and accommodation grew first the I.O., which catered especially for "under-divers". This organization needed small coup-de-main parties for raiding food offices and warehouses and the K.P. organization came to life to supply this need. The I.O. and K.P. organizations subsequently merged to all intents and purposes, K.P. being the shock troops of I.O.

A movement which attracted most of the amateur saboteurs was the N.V.V. which worked in Maquis style in the country districts. Many ex-army officers, business men and politicians joined the O.D., a movement which planned to take over the administration of the country when Holland had been liberated.

These four groups were subsequently merged to form the N.S.S. who directed all resistance activity on instructions from Prince Bernhard in London.

Other national movements which grew up during the occupation were M.O. which was concerned with welfare and social problems; N.S.F., which was the resistance movement's treasury; A.C., the Action Committee of the Dutch underground press and G.I.D. which was the organization controlling the black telephone system.

All these movements were represented during the latter stages of the occupation by F.A.R.I. an Advisory Committee to the Dutch underground movement consisting of 12 members representing all types of resistance activity, as shown below:-

<u>I.O.</u> (false papers) (etc., aid to <u>K.P.</u> refractaires.	In Autumn 1944 became:-	
<u>N.V.V.</u> Reception and sabotage.	<u>N.S.S.</u> Netherlands Forces of Interior.	} Advisory Committee Dutch Underground Movements - <u>F.A.R.I.</u>  (See working for A.N.S. and Civil Affairs.)
<u>O.D.</u> Post-war planning.	<u>M.O.</u> Welfare and Social Aid.	
	<u>N.S.F.</u> Finance Organization.	
	<u>A.C.</u> Action Committee Underground Press.	
	<u>G.I.D.</u> Black Telephone System.	

## I.O. - LANDLISKE ORGANISATIE.

This was a particularly active organization and supplied approximately 700,000 false papers of all types monthly. Besides finding accommodation and clothing for refractaires and escapees. Their methods are described at length later but one method of obtaining documents was to raid Government offices, steal supplies of permits, ration cards etc. and either use the originals or copy them. Raids were carried out by the K.P. groups.

K.F. - SNOK FLOEG. (later it was called KOMMUNISTE PATROUILLES)

K.F. groups of 7 or 8 men were the shock troops of L.O. and indulged in minor sabotage and small scale raids, in fact in any minor activities calculated to harass the Germans. They frequently engineered prison breaks and rescued comrades who had fallen foul of the Gestapo.

R.V.V. - RAAD VAN VERBOD.

This movement consisted of cells of 20 - 25 men, mainly working in country districts on major sabotage and receptions. They worked in some districts on Raquila lines and carried out attacks on military objectives as laid down in directives received from London. They also acquired military intelligence.

O.D. - ORDE DEERST.

The O.D. was not concerned with actively resisting the Germans. It had created a clandestine organisation which was piling up economic and political intelligence with a view to administering the country after the war.

GENERAL.

Inevitably, since all these organisations had grown in a slapdash fashion they were by no means watertight and most of the leaders and organisers of different movements knew each other personally. Equally members had at sometime or other worked for some or all of the four organisations and security was, therefore, not all that could be desired. There were also many personal and political feuds and much rivalry existed between the chiefs of the various movements.

O.D. came in for much criticism as active resisters liked neither their programme, which was negative, nor their principles. They were accused of being reactionary and, in some cases, of working for the Germans. Most of the other groups had left-wing tendencies. There was also a certain amount of overlapping, some movements taking part in activity which was nominally responsibility of others and in some areas where one organisation was stronger numerically than the others, it would engage in a multiplicity of resistance activities and cope with anything from false papers to major sabotage. In the latter stages L.O. had not so much work to do and its members joined the K.F. groups. Similarly O.D. members, tired of inaction, deserted O.D. for R.V.V. and K.F.

In the Autumn of 1944 liaison officers were sent to Holland with orders from Prince Bernhard to amalgamate all groups in the N.B.S. and not without trouble this was ultimately achieved and the N.B.S., Dutch Forces of the Interior, was created to cover all underground activity in the country.

The N.B.S. was formed on military lines in zones, regions and districts and Commanders, taken from the K.F., R.V.V., and O.D., were appointed by the Prince. Political rivalry and personal feuds almost succeeded in making the project impossible but the N.B.S. finally came into existence and is now providing the material for the new Dutch Army.



# INTRODUCTION OF LONDON TRAINED AGENTS TO EXISTING GROUPS.

## INITIAL CONTACTS.

Most London trained agents were sent either to one or the other of the existing groups which ultimately became amalgamated into the P.B.S. or to the underground press organization. Early contacts with indigenous groups were made by agents from England returning to Holland and re-establishing relations with friends who belonged to one or the other of the underground movements. Later, Dutchmen were exfiltrated to England and brought with them valuable information in the way of known sympathizers and up-to-date information on the resistance movements. A chain of contacts was thus built up and agents were sent out from England with a contact's address and usually a mission which necessitated their placing themselves at the disposal of local underground leaders.

The London trained agents, whilst rendering valuable service as liaison officers, W/T Operators and weapon training instructors, rarely took over complete control of independent groups or areas, as was the case in France but, in the main, were subordinated to Regional Commanders of already established indigenous groups. Once regular W/T communication was established with home base by London trained agents, the departure of an agent from this country could be advised to those in the field and his reception arranged.

## THE ARRIVAL OF INDIVIDUAL AGENTS.

Agents were normally dropped by parachute into Holland, although some were dropped in France and Belgium and made their way into Holland from there. Before leaving this country, the agent had many things to consider and was aware of the risks he ran in making the journey and returning clandestinely to his country. An unforeseen difficulty which occurred occasionally was when, due to the nervous tension of the agent on departure, he got into the wrong aeroplane and, consequently, was dropped to the wrong place and Reception Committee. His arrangements were further complicated if his baggage had been put into the correct aeroplane and consequently dropped to another point.

Once in the 'plane there was the danger of A.A. fire, which was intense over Holland and many agents lost their lives as the result of crash landings. There was also the danger of German fighters attacking the 'plane and, on some occasions, fighters followed the 'planes in and signalled news of the dropping operation to ground forces. In some cases the despatchers were at fault, dropping the stores too late or dropping the agents at too great a distance one from the other. Over the dropping point, if the lighting system were bad the 'plane had to circle once or twice, thus attracting attention and making things difficult for the agent on landing. Agents usually dropped to a Reception Committee but many were dropped 'blind' and left to their own devices.

Agents dropping to a Reception Committee were given a pass-word for the Reception Committee leader and told to place themselves under his orders until the necessary arrangements had been made to pass them on to the persons with whom they were expected to work. These arrangements did not always function smoothly. Reception Committees in Holland were usually para-

military operations, those participating relying more on Sten guns for protection than security measures. Consequently, pass-words, if they were remembered, were often ignored or overlooked in the general enthusiasm. There was frequently no security check, the U.R.O. message announcing the dropping being the only guarantee that the new arrival was genuine. Often, however, an agent was received by a friend or a fellow trainee from England and the pass-word was unnecessary. On some occasions agents were dropped in error to a Reception Committee other than the one awaiting them, but usually they managed without difficulty to persuade the Committee that they were genuine agents from London. A complaint received from many agents was that frequently Reception Committees were expecting stores only and the arrival of an agent was quite a surprise to them. This resulted in the new arrival waiting about for instructions until the Reception Committee got in touch with his contact. It is also true to say that it has frequently occurred, even when the agent's arrival had been pre-arranged, that local Commanders sometimes made no advance arrangements for the disposal of newly arrived agents. One report received states that agents had been shot by the underground movement, who suspected them of being spies because their arrival had not been announced.

In general, the Reception Committee personnel lacked discipline. The guards would leave their posts to greet the new arrivals and there was much talking and smoking, especially when the plane was late in arriving. If this happened security precautions were forgotten and people became impatient. Two other criticisms of Reception Committees are that far too many people attended the Reception. (Often up to 30 people would arrive to collect four or five containers and one agent.) Also far too many people knew the location of the dropping point.

Normally a newly arrived agent would be guided from the dropping point to a safe house by members of the Reception Committee. Subsequently he would be accompanied to a contact address where he would meet his chief to be, or the latter would visit him at the safe house.

Transport to and from the safe house was often available in the form of bicycles, ambulances, P.T.S. vans or milk lorries. Sometimes even in police cars. One method which was adopted to transport two agents from a safe house to a contact address in Rotterdam, was to stage an 'arrest' of the two agents at the safe house and transport them in a police van to their destination. The 'safe' houses used were not always particularly secure. Security was often negligible and people used them as rendezvous points where many people would meet and discuss their clandestine work. The arrival of an agent from England would often start a pilgrimage to a place, curious well-wishers desiring to meet an agent from London.

The Reception Committee, often assisted by the local Police Force, would dispose of the stores dropped with the agent and collect his equipment. The agent dropped 'blind' was free from the anxieties experienced in passing through a Reception Committee, but, on the other hand, he was handicapped in that he had to make his way alone to his contact address. If he were unfamiliar with the country, or had been away from Holland any length of time, he needed especially careful











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[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

Plausible cover stories for a living were almost invariably considered special requests for the very same reason. The fact that the subject was a high-ranking official in the State Department was not a sufficient reason for the subject to be granted a living. The fact that the subject was a high-ranking official in the State Department was not a sufficient reason for the subject to be granted a living. The fact that the subject was a high-ranking official in the State Department was not a sufficient reason for the subject to be granted a living.



APPENDIX A.

real name R. APPELBAUM. Interrogated by Capt. MATTHEW &  
Major HUGH  
Code Number 9.22 " on 17th June, 1945

At LA Holland

INTERVIEW OF INTERVIEWER OF INFORMANT.

Informant is a keen young Dutchman, highly patriotic, who seems to have done an excellent job of work for his country during the occupation. He gives the impression of complete reliability and good security mind.

BRIEF HISTORY.

Between 1941 and 1944 informant was a chemical student, but when the German control became more severe in 1942 he began to help people to escape. It then became necessary to supply them with forged papers, and it was in this way that he began his work.

A visit was made on June 12th 1945 to a small printing factory in 27 Jans Drasot, TRECHT. The firm was engaged in dye-setting, photogravure and engraving. Total personnel employed, 5 people, whose functions were, manager, photographer and labourers. Prior to September 1944 the firm was working quite legally and openly for industrial concerns in TRECHT and the region of TRECHT, and also producing letterheads and various types of permit for the movement. At first, there were many firms in TRECHT engaged in the production of false papers, but when conditions became difficult owing to the arrest of many people and the cut in electricity, informant's firm carried on with only one other organisation.

The clandestine work was carried out after the ordinary day's work had finished. Some or all of the staff worked every evening to supply the Resistance with all types of identity cards, permits, ration documents, etc., and the finished products were immediately removed by R. Appelbaum of a garage team at Appendix 1 in order that as little documentary material as possible might be left on the premises. After September, 1944 the plant was closed down by the Germans, and all work was then done illegally.

HISTORY OF ORGANISATION

At first only identity cards were forged, but in 1944 when the Germans discovered this forger, they began to demand more papers, and informant's organisation began to forge ration books as well.

The first forgery of papers was begun when the elimination of the Jews in HOLLAND was attempted. The "J" on the identity cards was obliterated by informant's organisation.

The next forgery was to change the number of the identity cards, as the organisation often used cards which had been lost, and the Germans had a list of the numbers of such cards.

Finally, whole new identity cards were forged, but the Germans discovered this when some of the people implicated were arrested. There were various means of proving that an identity card was forged, and the most effective way of doing this was to use an ultra-violet light.


Ordinary ink was used for writing on these forged documents, but care had to be taken to make the ink as near as possible to the official ink, which was very dark, due to the top being invariably left off the bottle, which tends to darken the ink. To obtain the correct colour, blue and black inks were mixed.







48. 67.21

$$\frac{A_1}{\omega} = \frac{A_2}{\omega} = \dots$$


Exhibition for British War Correspondents of the falsification centers  
 111, 2, May 14th 1945.

Purpose: The supply of facsimile documents to

1. Persons in hiding.
2. Illegal workers.
3. All persons who could commit sabotage herewith in some way or other.

For this purpose were copied or forged

1. Papers for legitimation of persons:

- a. identification cards
- b. stencards
- c. second stencards
- d. all kinds of legitimations such as appointments with magisterial instances and large private concerns.

a. Identification Cards.

1942 For Jews. Remove J stamps by pasting on and insert pieces again.

1942. Arbeitsinsatz. Change on a large scale chemically and mechanically of the identification cards.

1944. Application on a large scale of blank identification cards, obtained by attacks on municipal offices, which had however the disadvantages of being quickly signalled at the secret service. S.D. . Therefore the printed place names and code figures were altered. At the same time the PDS at A.B.T. had worked continuously at pirate copies. If, examples which are getting better and better in the course of years, but in practice were never equal to the stolen ones or to the real ones, distributed illegally.

b. Stencards

These were reprinted piratically elsewhere. In this town the necessary D.S.K.'s stencards were obtained by chemical removal of ink of written stencards. These were necessary for legitimization of persons for obtaining new second stencards, (td's).

c. T.D.'s (second stencards).

Reprinted practically in a large edition in AMSTERDAM. Especially when the official distribution was stopped, there was a great demand for them. The intimation has succeeded properly and gave in practice sufficient security when the distribution papers were fetched.

In 1945 these copies were much used for obtaining officially identification cards, as after the great Arbeitsinsatz in January 1945 many registers of population were entirely removed, by which control became impossible. (Also in connection with the destruction of the central register of population in the HAGUE of last year.)

d. Pe.

On a large scale pirated and real persons cards were inserted into diverse registers of population. This manipulation was especially important in obtaining the second stencard, (Td) in the Spring of 1944.

e. Legitimation cards were reprinted piratically in diverse editions, though also great concerns gave the opportunity to emboss easily such as the Post and Telegraph and the N.S.

2. Distribution papers for foodstuffs provision of persons in hiding. For these were wanted the already mentioned D.S.Ka stencards and T.D.s (second stencards). The T.D. distribution has been arranged

А. Г. Мельников "14"

[illegible]

was not the adjectives, neutral, however, for example of  
the old.

[illegible][illegible]

t. 19... The next tree tray as I work on the nestall-  
birds never gave me the limitation of thousands of celestial  
of ever being more significant, even +, April, August, de,  
the ... time 1, known, revealed, In all some tens of  
t. 19... 19

4. The total requirements necessitate the use of metal of various grades and alloy steel alloys, i.e., will also cover the cost.

erteilt u. setzt  
 vom 1.1.1947  
 an zu gelten  
 die kann  
 diese darstellen  
 nach der Stellung

Watermarks. These were not real invented but produced with a good stamp. They were excellent, but in a restricted edit on.

In consideration of the fact that the club in 1960, when freight was highest, was distributing 300,000 in new material, the 20 yellow membership cards, the letter was sent first and late in spite of the fact that only 10 could be distributed.

تاریخ اسلام - ۱۴۲۹ھ

Arriving licences, & clin. permit, travelling tickets, travelling permits etc. Also securities of letters of official bodies in order to obtain exemptions from diverse work or extra rations.

Commissions for illegal movements. The last for K. . . etc.  
For all these papers a great many stamps were wanted. Of those  
about 500 stamps were used and closely printed of various kinds at  
the order of other groups. Figures about turnover of papers,  
edition; edition likewise. 1,000 live as circulation, about 500,  
various kinds; the last edition 1000 out of stock in 10 days.

Number of workers about 25, among whom

technical men 7 for printing	couriers 2.
draughtsmen 4	leaders 2.
photographer 1	old snake 3.
cleaner of ident. card. 4	
Typists 2.	

Per month fixed salaries P.800 - or P.900,  
materials, cents etc. P.700.  
P.1600.

All documents always distributed gratis.



Appendix 'ii' (3)

Difficulties:

Without electricity, gas, fuel, cycles etc. etc. the group experienced between September 1944 and the end of the war an unknown prosperity. Printed under very difficult circumstances. The cliche photographer had to work with daylight. The printing took place with a handpress. Drawing was done in the cold. After much difficulty technical and paid hands were kept at work with extra food.

[illegible]

# INDEX

[illegible][illegible]

Assistance was at this time to be given, but informant was in fact in the last or near the last days of his life and he was not to be troubled by such matters, and knew nothing of any of the above mentioned activities.

...the latter proposed to work on his own, and to confine his activities to his own profession i.e. helping students who had dropped the German language courses. His work was continued to do among their activities, from 1940 to 1941 when he became a prominent member of the ... with PIET Van ...

In 1941 the Germans began to put it to effect the various threats previously issued with regard to ex-officers of the Dutch Army, and all officers were ordered to proceed to a report office at a DISPOONT for registration. Many of the officers were doing important administrative work for the

Government and for this reason were exempted. Thousands of these exemptions were issued, the majority of them completely bogus, and it was even possible, by making the right approach to the Germans, to get an exemption without difficulty. Informant, however, refused in principle to apply for an exemption as the Queen had issued definite orders that officers were not to register, and in any case he did not wish to ask favours from the Germans. Informant pointed out with regret that thousands of officers were weak enough to ignore the Queen's order and went off to register. They bought return tickets for the journey but the return half was not used. They finished up in Germany. Those officers who did not register were not in any immediate danger as the Germans did not have complete lists of all Army officers, and in this respect the Dutch Record Offices were obstructive and unhelpful to the Germans. Many important archives had been destroyed deliberately to this end.

Informant, however, like many other officers who had failed to register, thought his arrest was imminent and, as he was well-known in UTRECHT, he decided to leave his wife and family and go underground in another part of the country. What decided his departure more than anything was the fact that among the students at the college were many sons of prominent I.S.S. officials and he feared that his activities concerned with helping refractaires might be known. In the event of arrest for non-registration, enquiries might result in all his underground activities being revealed.

Most of his friends and acquaintances were under the impression that he had registered but those who knew him well and guessed he had not tried to persuade him to comply with the law and remain safely in UTRECHT with his wife and family. He finally gave out that he was going to AMSTERDAM to register and one of his friends undertook to look after his wife and family in his absence. The college, after some time, assumed that he had been deported to Germany and struck him off their books.

He left UTRECHT in the beginning of 1943 and went to stay at BEEKBERGEN, a small village 6 miles from APPELDOORN, where he stayed with a friend who was already in underground work, also assisting refractaires by obtaining for them rapiers and accommodation.

#### 1. Informant's Activities Prior to Working with M.S.S.

On arriving in BEEKBERGEN, informant joined his friend and they, with two other local men, formed a small group to whom parents came for assistance when their sons had fallen foul of the labour laws. Most of the boys were of the student type and informant's main concern for them was to arrange the continuation of their studies or, alternatively, to get them apprenticed to the professions they would normally have taken up. Once the parents had handed the boy over to informant's group, the parents had no further contact with him, and the boys were under strict orders not to attempt to see their parents again.

In and around BEEKBERGEN are a number of small summer houses which informant's group took over and there the boys were billeted under close supervision till other accommodation could be found or situations obtained for them.

Whilst waiting, papers were obtained for them, and in the interim period they continued their studies, some of them even taking correspondence courses. Ultimately, they were placed on



farms, in industry, or apprenticed to doctors or chemists, always with the connivance of employers as informant travelled the country seeking out friends and contacts who were willing to accept the boys and give them work. His contacts were usually on a high level and he had friends in the Arbeits bureau at APPLICORN, who procured for him stacks of movement orders already signed in advance by the German supervisors, which allowed the boys to travel. These movement orders were issued to boys who had registered for work in Germany and indicated the date on which the bearer was to report for work. Naturally these dates had been arranged by informant to give a handsome margin of time and a boy carrying a movement order of this sort was immune from any sort of enquiry. These papers were issued to refractaires when they were actually travelling and on arrival at their destination informant arranged with friends in the different Arbeits bureaux to register them on the books as working for the particular employer chosen by informant from among his circle of acquaintances. In many cases the boys did not change their identity cards as their only crime was in failing to register and this was covered by the bogus movement order they carried. In most of the administrations who employed boys sponsored by informant, only two people knew the boys' real status, the manager and the staff manager, who, in collusion with an Arbeits bureau representative, arranged the records.

The L.O. organisation had by then been functioning on a big scale all over Holland doing more or less the same work as informant but helping not only students but anybody who was leading an illegal life. They did not take the same fatherly interest in their proteges as did informant and once they had dealt with a case, had nothing more to do with the individual.

The APPLICORN area was not covered by L.O. as they had few contacts there, but they heard of informant's work through a friend of his who was in touch with the L.O. and sent a representative to ask him to work for them. By this time informant had contacts all over Holland and was a very useful recruit for L.O. He agreed to work for them and from then on extended his activities to cover the different types of sandy people catered for by L.O. This meant that he could no longer devote his time and labours exclusively to students, and this part of his work he delegated to the other members of his small original group of 4. He could no longer give the same attention to his proteges in view of the increase in his work, but one advantage in his line up with L.O. was that he could obtain papers much more easily as L.O. had a very efficient machinery for this particular need. Informant obtained from them over 600 sets of papers for students, and they were his first source of supply on a big scale.

To show the way in which his work increased, informant mentioned that in January 1944 he supplied approximately 600 sets of documents but in February 1945 2,700 sets which he had at his disposal were insufficient for the needs of his organisation. In the early days informant had acquired false papers from a friend in AMSTERDAM, who was a chemical student and was doing rather well in an amateurish way. Informant himself took a short course in AMSTERDAM in the falsification of documents. The methods employed did not differ from those already explained in previous reports forwarded in connection with the STRAUCH false paper establishment. Informant's methods are explained below.

## 2. Cover.

As already stated, informant left UTRECHT for BREKERS early in 1943 and from then on discontinued his teaching and devoted all his energies to clandestine work. He first lived with his friend in BREKERS but afterwards moved into his own cottage there and subsequently his wife and family came there to live also. He was living on his means as the college in UTRECHT no longer paid him. Right up to June 1944 he used his own papers, accepting the risk of enquiries being made. He never altered the name on his papers, but in 1945 when everybody was conscripted for O.T. work and trench-digging, he changed his profession and became a Protestant pastor. He knew something of clerical matters having friends in the clergy who would have spoken for him, and in Christmas 1944 a rest home for Protestant clergymen advertised for a barman, which post informant obtained and lived at the home for some months with his wife and family also on the premises. He was thus able to acquire enough knowledge to enable him to pass a normal interrogation on the street.

For his clandestine work, although carrying papers in his real name, he assumed various false names for different regions and types of work. He realized the danger here and quoted the case of a friend, STOFFEL, who used his own name and papers, being known to friends in resistance by a false name. This man was once interrogated in the presence of a contact to whom he was talking and when the contact was asked STOFFEL's name answered promptly that the name was JANSSEN. STOFFEL/JANSSEN was thereupon arrested as was the contact.

Informant was never seriously disturbed by controls as he is over 44 years old and the Germans were concentrating on young men. The German controls were not particularly clever, the Dutch S.D. were far more dangerous. Informant quoted a case of a street control through which he passed when an S.D. man examined his identity card and although informant said his profession was that of a teacher, the S.D. man insisted he must be a butcher as he saw on the card the maiden name of informant's wife, FLEISCHER. The S.D. and Gröenpolizei seemed to concentrate on young men between 20 and 30 and two of informant's proteges were arrested because they were unwise enough to go to AMSTERDAM without papers to see their parents.

## 3. Organisation and Communications (Internal).

As will be seen from attached diagram, informant had very few full-time workers. He employed a secretary who was a young refractaire and was living completely underground, 2 or 3 girl couriers and a policeman suffering from a "political" illness, who was on prolonged sick leave. All other contacts or helpers were living quite legally, most of them working in some official capacity. Although informant himself maintained communication by personal visits to sympathisers, those persons who received assistance never met him but applied through contact addresses, leaving messages which were collected by courier. Material was distributed in the same way.

In order to obtain full information with regard to services required, informant had printed a number of questionnaires in code, of which a specimen is attached, asking age, religion, profession, details of papers already in possession etc. In this way he maintained records of what assistance had been rendered and to whom.



The three contact addresses were known to about 20 people in all but informant's address and name were in general not known to the mass of people being helped. The contact addresses were changed frequently and were usually shops. Messages for informant were placed in an envelope bearing a sign of some sort but no name and left with the shopkeeper for collection later by courier.

Informant had some trouble with people applying for more than their quota of papers and these cases he passed to his Investigation Section, i.e. the policeman, who, with the assistance of the records kept, checked up on applicants.

Informant had a small finance section, which obtained funds from wealthy sympathisers and from sales of illegal newspapers. Later there was a central organisation in AMSTERDAM with unlimited funds and a representative in AMSTERDAM to whom informant applied when he needed cash.

#### 4. Security Precautions.

Apart from an understanding among the members of informant's group and among all contacts that warning of enemy action was to be circulated immediately, no security rules existed in the organisation. Informant's own personal courier knew all addresses and could warn everybody in a very short time.

#### 5. Methods of Obtaining False Papers.

There were three methods of obtaining papers:

- (a) With the connivance of officials, who supplied them in bulk.
- (b) By raiding offices and stealing supplies. This was done by K.P. members at the request of L.O.
- (c) By reproducing false papers or altering papers to meet particular needs.

In most cases informant resorted to method (a) but L.O. usually supplied him with papers acquired by method (b). Informant had contacts everywhere who could supply him with genuine documents, and by using the same methods as the UTRECHT group, which methods were more or less generally resorted to, he was able to alter cards to suit his purpose. Ration cards were in great demand among resistance members for when men reported for work in Germany they were given a movement order, the date of departure being altered illegally by the holder to delay the move to Germany. However, when this was done, the Arbeits bureau took the man's ration card as officially he no longer needed it. The stencard or ration book was issued before identity cards became compulsory, but the first stencard was later cancelled and a new one issued. A corner of the old card was clipped off and in exchange for this coupon a new card was issued and at the same time the holder was asked to produce an identity card which was stamped at the same time. L.O. printed thousands of clippings, entitling the holder to draw a new stencard. Another method adopted by informant was to draw up lists of hundreds of people who had never existed, with full particulars of date and place of birth etc. These lists he handed to friends in the Town Hall, who created dossiers which were included in the official records and papers were then issued in their names. These false dossiers were removed from the Town Hall if there was any very serious inspection of the records and replaced afterwards. Through